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Abstract
Can groups with equal productive potential end up in equilibria in
which they get diﬀerent average wages? In this paper we consider a
simple model of statistical discrimination that shows that this might
be the case. Discrimination in this model is possible because of the
existence of multiple equilibria. We consider what determines whether
such multiplicity is possible, what types of policies might be used to
eliminate discrimination in this situation and, ﬁnally, we test the main
hypothesis of this model, namely, that identical groups will be treated
equally. Our empirical results suggest, however, that discrimination is
more due to structural diﬀerences in the wage setting schedules faced
by black and white males than to a coordination failure caused by
statistical discrimination.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. In the ﬁrst part we extend Lundberg
and Starz’ (1983)-L&S- model of statistical discrimination to illustrate the
diﬀerences between the case in which discrimination is caused by underlying
diﬀerences between groups or the market conditions they face and the case in
which discrimination is the consequence of a coordination failure even if the
fundamental parameters of the model are symmetrical with respect to race.
In particular, we will show how the qualitative properties of these two types
of equilibria are essentially diﬀerent, which has important implications for
the eﬀectiveness of possible aﬃrmative action policies. In the second part of
the paper, we test whether discrimination is caused by a coordination failure
and show that the empirical evidence is at odds with the implications of the
theoretical model.
Although many theories on labor market discrimination, e.g. Becker
(1957, 1972), have emphasized the possible diﬀerences in market conditions
and productive potential that might lead some groups to get diﬀerent wages
than others, there is also a branch in the literature that considers the possi-
bility of discrimination being caused by the existence of multiple equilibria
and possible self fulﬁlling stereotypes, like for example Arrow (1972a, b,
1973), Coate and Loury (1993), Kremer (1993), and more recently, Moro
and Norman (1996)and Moro (1998) . Discrimination as a result of a coor-
dination failure in which one group ends up in a low productivity - low wage
equilibrium and the other in a high productivity - high wage equilibrium
is theoretically a very appealing scenario. This because it does not require
any assumptions on why and how groups, like various ethnic groups or men
and women, are diﬀerent in their productive potential or the market con-
ditions they face. Instead, the coordination failure theory of discrimination
illustrates how, in principle, identical groups can adopt diﬀerent strategies
in equilibrium.
It was Becker (1957)who initiated the discussion on the economics of dis-
crimination. His premise was that employers discriminated in the sense that
they had a distaste for workers from certain groups, making them willing to
make a ﬁnancial sacriﬁce in order to hire workers of the preferred type. This
kind of taste discrimination will ultimately lead to the discriminated group
getting lower wages than the others. Becker’s approach has been criticized
mainly on the basis of two arguments. The ﬁrst is that it breaks with the
assumption that ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers and instead assumes that ﬁrms
2are utility maximizing entities. This makes welfare comparisons in taste dis-
crimination models virtually impossible. The second is that Becker fails to
explain how the taste discrimination that he assumes can persist in perfectly
competitive markets. In particular, if there are ﬁrms in the market that do
not discriminate against blacks, there would be no discrimination in the long
run.
In order to overcome these disadvantages of Becker’s theory, Phelps (1972)
and Arrow (1973)considered the possibility of discrimination as a result of
an imperfection in the labor market. In particular, they considered models in
which employers receive an imperfect signal about the productivity of their
prospective employees. In that case, Phelps (1972)and Arrow (1973)show
that employers have the incentive to judge the job applicants not only on
the basis of their personal merits but also on the characteristics of the group
that they belong to. There is, however, a major diﬀerence between Phelps’
and Arrows’ analyses.
Phelps shows that when blacks send a more noisy signal than whites,
they will be judged more on the basis of their group characteristics than
whites, and therefore, will have a lower return to their individual investment
in education. This would eventually lead to blacks investing less in education
than whites and thus getting lower average wages than whites. His analysis
though, does not motivate any potential explanation by which the labor
market signal of blacks would be more noisy than that of whites. Arrow
shows that even when two groups are completely identical, i.e. both in their
productive potential as well as in the reliability of their labor market signal, it
might actually be the existence of multiple equilibria that leads to one group
ending up in a low wage-low productivity equilibrium and the other in a high
wage-high productivity equilibrium. In particular, the existence of multiple
equilibria allows for the existence of self-fulﬁlling stereotypes. That is, if, for
some reason, employers expect that black workers are less productive than
white workers this might lower the incentive for black workers to invest in
their human capital and eventually lead black workers to end up being less
productive than whites.
Our model is a generalization of that considered by Lundberg (1991)and
L&S. We will show how the model can yield similar results as those presented
by Arrow (1973), namely, it will lead to the possible existence of multiple
equilibria in the case when two groups are completely identical. Though
the same result, the mechanisms underlying it are diﬀerent in our model.
In particular, we couple Phelps’ bayesian inference by employers of workers’
3qualiﬁcations with Arrow’s imperfect capital markets assumption to get our
result. This way, we do not assume any cost of screening workers, as it is
necessary in Arrow’s model to get multiple equilibria.
The statistical discrimination model introduced in this paper is the ﬁrst
with possible multiple equilibria in which agents have a convex choice set for
their human capital investment and in which the technology does not exhibit
any complementarities. That is, in Arrow (1973), Coate and Loury (1993),
Moro and Norman (1996)and Moro (1998)agents can only choose to be either
skilled or unskilled while in the model introduced here agents can choose a
continuum of education levels. Furthermore, a skill complementarity in the
O-ring technology considered by Kremer (1993)implies that the marginal
productivity of a worker and thus his incentive to invest in human capital is
increasing in the average productivity level of the workers with whom he is
matched. Finally, though Lundberg (1991)and L&S do use both a continuum
of education levels and their models do not exhibit complementarities, their
model fails to generate the multiplicity of equilibria. Similar to Arrow (1973)
and Coate and Loury (1993), externalities in the production technology do
not play any role in the generation of multiple equilibria in our model, as
they do in Moro and Norman (1996)and Moro (1998) .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce
the basic model of statistical discrimination that we will use in the rest of
the paper. In Section 3 we will consider the two cases of possible equilibria
of this model for various combinations of parameter values and identify when
a strategic complementarity can lead to the existence of multiple equilibria.
In Section 4 we will test the main implication that distinguishes the models
that explain discrimination as a coordination failure due to multiple equilibria
from the rest of the theories on discrimination. This null hypothesis is that
if groups were identical in their human capital distributions then they would
face equal wage schedules. This null hypothesis is tested using an extension
of the standard wage equation in which the log of the (hourly)wages is
considered a function of (potential)experience and education. Our results
suggest that, contrary to the coordination failure theory of discrimination
which predicts that wage diﬀerences between groups can be fully explained
by diﬀerences in their human capital distributions, if one takes into account
the human capital distributions non-statistical discrimination seems to be
more severe than when one does not.
42 A simple model of statistical discrimination
We will use the following simple model of statistical discrimination to illus-
trate the various possible causes of strategic complementarities that might
result in the existence of multiple equilibria. The model is a generalization
of L&S. It consists of two periods. In the ﬁrst period prospective employees
choose their level of investment in education. In the second period em-
ployers, that do not observe the employees’ marginal productivity of labor,
observe an imperfect labor market signal for each prospective employee and
use it to make them a wage oﬀer. Due to competitiveness of the labor market
this wage oﬀer will be such that the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts will equal zero.
More importantly, the expected wage oﬀer will be a weighted average of the
individual’s productivity level and that of the group he or she belongs to.
There is a continuum of agents on the interval [0,1], indexed by i,t h a t
all inelastically supply one unit of labor, i.e. Li =1 . Their individual output
level depends on their human capital, or rather productivity, level, denoted








The labor market is competitive. Hence, in the case of perfect information
this would simply lead to every individual getting a wage equal to her mar-
ginal product of labor, hi. However, we will assume that person i’s exact
human capital level is not known to the employer. Instead, the ﬁrm gets an
imperfect labor market signal, Ti, of the form
Ti = hi + εi
where εi ∼ iid(0,σ ε) and the distributions of hi and εi are common knowl-
edge to both the ﬁrms and the workers. From the competitiveness of the
labor market it follows that the ﬁrms will set the wages, wi, such that
wi = E [hi | Ti]
This is a simple signal extraction problem. It can be easily seen that rational
expectations imply that the resulting wage setting schedule is a weighted





= βTi +( 1− β)h = βhi +( 1− β)h + βεi (1)











The individuals’ educational expenses, ei, determine her productivity level
through the “schooling”-technology
hi = Si (ei)
where, for all i, Si : + → + is assumed to be strictly concave and to satisfy
the following Inada-type conditions: lim
ei↓0
S
i (ei)=∞ and lim
ei↑∞
S
i (ei)=0 .F o l -
lowing L&S and Kremer (1993), we will assume that employees choose their
education level, ei to maximize their expected net wage. That is, employees















The latter implies that the marginal revenue of education equals its marginal
cost. In order to make the results in the rest of the paper tractable, we will






where γ ∈ (0,1) and ai and bi are independent2 random variables that rep-
resent the persons marginal ability to learn and initial productivity level
respectively. Including a random component which aﬀects workers marginal
ability to learn is the key element which diﬀerences this model from that of
L&S, and as will become clear shortly, is crucial in the generation of multiple
1This functional form is a generalization of that used by L&S and Lundberg (1992),
whose assumptions basically imply that Si (ei)=2 e
1/2
i + bi.
2Independence of ai and bi is simply assumed for convenience and does not inﬂuence the
results below. That is, the same results can be derived assuming there is some correlation
between someone’s initial talent and her subsequent learning abilities.
6equilibria in the model. In order to get the equilibrium results of Section 4
using the simplest setup we will assume that Ln(ai) ∼ N(µa,σ a). Further-







Under full-information, in equilibrium every worker will get a level of
productivity and schooling hf = Sf = a1/(1−γ)+b, by investing ef = γa1/(1−γ).
The per capita net social product of the investment in education is Sf −ef −
S (0) = (1 − γ)a1/(1−γ).
On the other hand, under imperfect information, i.e., when workers face
wage schedule (1), workers invest e = γ (βa)








Notice that in this case, contrary to the model of L&S, the amount in-
vested in schooling is stochastic. While in their model all workers obtain
the same amount of education and correspondingly, productivity, in this pa-
per workers’ heterogeneity leads to diﬀerences in education levels, and to a
distribution of productivity levels.
The per capita net social product of the investment in education in this
case is increasing monotonically in β, a n di sg i v e nb yS − e − S (0) =
(1 − βγ)(βa)
1/(1−γ).
That is, under imperfect information workers invest less, getting to an
equilibrium with a lower productivity and a lower net social product of the
investment in education.
Using the assumed log-normality of ai we ﬁnd that
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a. Throughout the paper we will only consider pure strategy
7Nash equilibria in the ﬁrst period of the game3. In that case an equilibrium


























Notice that this equation for β would be the same equation (10)in L&S
if we had not introduced heterogeneity in the innate marginal ability to learn
of workers. That subtle assumption is what allows β to appear in the right
hand side of the equation as an additional component of the variance of the
productivity level in the population.
In the following section we will use this condition to illustrate two types
of equilibria considered in the literature. But before considering several types
of equilibria we ﬁrst notice that it follows immediately from Brouwer’s ﬁxed
point theorem that the function f, as deﬁned in 3 has at least one ﬁxed point.
3 Discriminatory equilibria
In this section we will introduce two types of equilibrium outcomes of the
model introduced above. The ﬁrst is in the spirit of Phelps (1972)and
L&S and assumes that diﬀerent groups obtain diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes
because they basically face diﬀerent market conditions. In particular, just
l i k ei nP h e l p s( 1 9 7 2 )a n dL & S ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a to n eg r o u ps e n d sal e s s
reliable labor market signal than the other. The second is what we denote as
the coordination failure theory of discrimination, and follows Arrow (1973)
and Coate and Loury (1993). It assumes that both groups face identical
market conditions but that the existence of multiple equilibria allows for
self-fulﬁlling stereotypes. We will show what types of externalities cause
these multiple equilibria, argue why it would be possible for groups to end
up in diﬀerent equilibria and illustrate how this result can be considered a
coordination failure in the tradition of Cooper and John (1988).
3The equilibria derived in this paper are subgame perfect equilibria, where in each stage
of the game we limit our focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria.
83.1 Groups face diﬀerent market conditions
In this subsection we will consider a discriminatory equilibrium based on
the one derived by L&S. In the equilibrium the wage setting schedules of
two types of people in the economy diﬀers because of a diﬀerence in the
reliability of the labor market signal the two groups send. We will assume
that the economy consists of two groups of people characterized by an obvious
characteristic. Clearly, gender and race are two of them, but we can also
consider less obvious things like obesity, baldness, etc.. Both groups consist




,i sc o m m o n
knowledge. In the simple equilibrium model developed in the previous section
there is no interaction between the two groups. Hence, we can simply look
at the two separate equilibrium β’s, i.e. β and β for the groups of type θ and
θ respectively. Following L&S we will make the following assumption4.





denote the variances of the learning ability levels and the initial human
capital levels of the two groups and, correspondingly, let σ2
ε and σ2
ε be
the variances of the noise in the labor market signals, then (i) σ2
a =
σ2
a =0 , (ii) σ2
b = σ2
b > 0, (iii) σ2
ε > σ2
ε.
This assumption has basically the following two implications. First, since
(i) implies that everyone has the same marginal product of education, that is
ai is equal for all agents, everyone will decide on identical educational levels.
Second, (ii) and (iii) imply that the labor market signal of people with type































It follows from assumption 3.1 that β < β, because of the diﬀerence in the
reliability of the labor market signals between the two groups. Hence, this
4µb is assumed to be equal for both groups throughout this section. Furthermore, in
our numerical examples that follow below we assume µa = γγ − 1
2σ2







9is clearly a discriminatory equilibrium because the diﬀerence in the market
conditions faced by the groups with equal initial endowments of productive
potential lead to an ex post diﬀerence in the wage setting schedule faced
by the two groups. The problem with the discriminatory outcome of this
equilibrium is that it is completely based on the assumption that the labor
market signal of one group is less reliable than that of another which is
hardly veriﬁable. Hence, while for this type of equilibrium one does not
have to assume that groups diﬀer in their productive potential, one still has
to argue why groups diﬀer in the reliability of their labor market signal5.
Furthermore, this equilibrium, similar to that of Kremer (1993), is one in
which everyone chooses identical educational levels. It would be more realistic
to consider the case in which for each group we obtain a distribution of
educational investments that is not degenerate. In the next subsection we
will derive such an equilibrium and show that it is exactly the ﬂuctuation in
the variance of the human capital distribution, which we model introducing
heterogeneity in the marginal ability to learn, what can generate the strategic
complementarities necessary for the existence of multiple equilibria.
3.2 Groups face identical market conditions: Multiple
equilibria
In this subsection we will consider parameter combinations of the model
that yield the existence of multiple equilibria. All these equilibria have the
property that, within each group, there is a distribution of education levels.
This is caused by the fact that individuals each have a random marginal
ability to learn, i.e. σ2
a > 0 for both groups. In the ﬁrst part we will
look at the case in which σ2
b = σ2
b =0and will derive the exact parameter
combinations that yield multiplicity. In the second part we will consider the
general case in which σ2
b and σ2
b do not necessarily equal zero and present
a similar analysis. Finally, we will brieﬂy discuss the possible reasons why
diﬀerent groups might end up in diﬀerent equilibria.
Before studying the general case, we will ﬁrst consider the case in which
σ2
b = σ2
b =0 . That is, we will make the following assumption
5One possibility pointed at by Arrow (1973) is based on the theory of cognitive disso-
nance as developed by Festinger (1957). Under this view, if individuals discriminate, they
might justify such action by subjectively assigning beliefs to the two groups involved, so
that his action of discriminating becomes justiﬁed by such beliefs.




b denote the variances of the learning
ability levels and the initial human capital levels of the two groups and,
correspondingly, let σ2
ε and σ2
ε be the variances of the noise in the labor
market signals, then (i) σ2
a = σ2
a = σ2
a > 0, (ii) σ2
b = σ2
b = σ2





This assumption is made for analytical convenience, because it leads to a
simpliﬁcation of (3)that turns out to be tractable. The main diﬀerence be-
tween this assumption and assumption 3.1 is that, since σ2
a > 0, the collective
educational decisions are going to inﬂuence the variance of the human capital
distribution and therefore the wage setting schedule. That is, if everyone in
a group would decide to increase their educational level, this would lead to
an increase in σ2
h and therefore to an increase in β. This increase in β would
in turn increase each individuals’ incentive to invest in education. Hence,
assuming σ2
a > 0 yields a strategic complementarity, as described by Cooper
and John (1988)6.
In the following we will derive the conditions under which there is more
than one equilibrium, that is the conditions under which ex post the groups
might behave diﬀerently. This amounts to showing that the function f :















can have more than one ﬁxed point. This is formally stated in the fol-
lowing proposition which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 1  β =0is always a ﬁxed point of the function f∗ deﬁned
in equation (4). There might be one or two additional ﬁxed points,
depending on the following three cases:
(i) γ<1
3: f∗ has one  β ∈ (0,1).
(ii) γ = 1


























, where η =
3γ−1
1−γ .
6Kremer (1993) uses Cooper and Johns’ analysis to illustrate a strategic complementar-
ity in a model of statistical discrimination caused by a complementarity in the production
technology. In Moro and Norman (1996) the technology also exhibits complementarities.
11Hence, for all values of γ we obtain a degenerate equilibrium in which no
one invests in education. Economically, this simply implies that if no one
else is educated, employers do not expect an individual to be educated and
thus do not reward this, making it optimal not to invest in education either.
As we will show below this result changes in case σ2
b > 0.
Focusing on the equilibria where  β ∈ (0,1], we ﬁnd that there can be more
than one interior equilibria in case the degree of concavity of the schooling
technology is low. Basically, we can distinguish two eﬀects that reinforce each
other. First, collectively increasing the level of education leads to a higher
average productivity. Second, collectively increasing the level of education
leads to a higher variance of human capital levels and thus to a higher equi-
librium β. These two eﬀects, which reinforce each other, lead to strategic
complementarities and the possible existence of multiple equilibria. That is,
if the second eﬀect is strong enough multiple equilibria are possible. Since
the increase in the variance is decreasing in the concavity of S (e), we ﬁnd
that strategic complementarities are stronger the bigger γ.
A surprising result from the proof of proposition 1 is that the higher




ε, the lower the interior equilibrium value of β when multiplicity
occurs. Of course, the distance between the two equilibrium β is as well
increasing in it. That means that the model can only generate reasonable
equilibria for intermediate values of such ratio. When the signal is too noisy
in relation to the variance of the learning ability multiple equilibria might not
exist. In the opposite case, diﬀerences in the interior βs would be too large.
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where we depict f∗ (β) for several parameter
combinations. Finally, as demonstrated in the appendix, for multiplicity to
exists in this case, we need σ2
ε <  σ
2
a, that is, the variation in productivity
due to the component of the marginal ability to learn must be larger than
the noise.
For the general case in which σ2
b ≥ 0 we get the following result:
Proposition 2 The ﬁxed point properties of the function f∗, deﬁned in
equation (3), are determined according to two cases:
(i) γ ≤ 1
3: f∗ has one ﬁxed point,  β ∈ (0,1).
(ii) γ>1
3: f∗ has either one, two or three ﬁxed points,  βi ∈ (0,1), ∀i.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the eﬀect of a change in σ2
b and γ respectively7.
Because the larger σ2
b, the smaller the inﬂuence of the educational choice on
7Each ﬁgure considers a change from the benchmark case: σ2
a =0 .06, σ2
b =0 .06,
12the equilibrium outcome, when σ2
b is big enough relative to  σ
2
a the multiple
equilibria will be eliminated. This can be seen from ﬁgure 2 where it is clear
that for large σ2
b the low (interior)equilibrium is eliminated. From ﬁgure 3 it
can be seen that the less concave the schooling technology the less decreasing
the returns to education and the more people invest in human capital. Hence,
the high equilibrium is increasing in γ.
Although the model introduced explains the possibility of two identical
groups ending up in diﬀerent equilibria it does not address the question why
this would actually be the case. Two explanations, both initially considered
by Arrow (1972), have mostly been analyzed in the literature. Both theories
are based on assumptions about beliefs that are not explicitly modeled. The
ﬁrst explanation, known as that of negative stereotypes, assumes that em-
ployers have a negative prejudism against employees from a certain group.
Such an expectation might actually lead to a decreased incentive for individ-
uals from this group to invest in human capital. This decreased in investment
would lead this group to become less productive and thus to these negative
stereotypes being self fulﬁlling. The second explanation is an attempt to
explain the evolution of discrimination over time. It assumes that employ-
ers have adaptive expectations about the human capital distributions of the
groups, i.e. they base their expectations on the situation in the previous
period. Such an assumption would lead to the following law of motion for β
βt+1 = f (βt) (5)
which yields the phase diagram depicted in ﬁgure 4, where A and C are
stable equilibria and B is unstable. Equation (5)implies that whether a
group moves to equilibrium A or C fully depends on their initial β.H e n c e ,
assuming that one group starts below A and the other one in between B and
C, would allow for a situation in which the “discriminated” group initially
seems to catch up with the other one, but eventually this catch up eﬀect
stagnates and ultimately there would be a persistent gap between the group
that is determined by the diﬀerence between A and C.
A third explanation that has not yet been considered in the economic lit-
erature on discrimination, but that seems to be supported by some empirical
ﬁndings from psychology, is the possibility of a negative self image of certain
σ2
e =1and γ =0 .5,w hi l e µa = γγ − 1
2σ2
a. This parameter combination is chose because
it captures L&S degree of concavity and yields multiple equilibria as shown in proposition
2.
13groups. This again explains discrimination as a self fulﬁlling prophecy but
in this case there are not the employers but the people in the discriminated
group themselves that have self fulﬁlling expectations. Suppose, that every-
one in a group expects to be discriminated, then this might actually lead to
a coordination failure that drives the group into the low wage - low produc-
tivity equilibrium. That negative self images are not purely hypothetical is
shown, for example, by Steele (1997)who ﬁnds that when blacks, taking a
test, were told that such tests showed no distinction in white-black scores,
they do as well as white test-takers. But when they are told nothing, or have
to tell their race, their scores are lower than those of whites. An obvious
possible reason why groups might have a negative self image is because of
past experience. In the most extreme case this would mean that even though
policies might successfully have eliminated previously existing discriminatory
market conditions, the fact that people don’t believe in these policies might
still lead to ex ante identical groups in society, ex post, to obtain diﬀerent
average productivity levels and wages.
3.3 Policy implications
It turns out that the two scenarios usually considered in the economic litera-
ture presented above have very diﬀerent implications for possible aﬃrmative
action and anti-discrimination policies. The main point is that policies can
more easily be used to change incentives than to change expectations. That
is, if groups face diﬀerent market conditions, it is often possible to overcome
these diﬀerences by using policies to change incentives. In particular, L&S
show that in the situation described in 3.1, imposing the same wage setting
schedule for both groups leads to a Pareto dominant outcome. As Lundberg
(1991)shows, this result is not robust against the ass umption that the true
wage schedule is not perfectly observed by the authorities, but has to be esti-
mated. More importantly, consider imposing the same wage setting schedule
in case of a coordination failure. In that case, there are two possibilities:
Both groups obtaining the high-productivity/high-wage equilibrium versus
both groups obtaining the low equilibrium. The former would clearly be a
preferred situation, but we have no argument why the economy would end
up in that situation.
In a model in which workers are either hired (or promoted)for skilled jobs
or not, Coate and Loury (1993)show that there is another important draw-
back to imposing equal standards, in this case considered hiring/promotion
14rates, for two groups in case they diﬀer because of a coordination failure.
Such a policy would give employers the incentive to put up lower standards
for one group than for the other and therefore lowering the low-productivity
group’s incentive to increase its productivity, leading to an even more severe
productivity disparity between both groups. This is known as a “patron-
izing” equilibrium. Benoit (1994)criticizes this conclusion. He shows that
Coate and Loury’s patronizing equilibria can be avoided by imposing a policy
that enforces a gradual adjustment to equal hiring/promotion rates.
Throughout the discussion on the eﬀectiveness of aﬃrmative action poli-
cies in eliminating discriminatory labor market situations, one has to bear in
mind that, though the scenarios presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2 and also
scenarios about diﬀerences in school quality between various groups seem to
be competitive, the discrimination we observe in reality is probably a com-
bination of all of them. This would imply that we probably need more than
one drug to cure the disease. In order to assess which policy might be most
eﬀective it is important, though, to determine which scenario is the most
relevant in practice. For this reason, we introduce an econometric exercise
in the next section.
4E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
As shown in Sections 2 and 3, the two types of discriminatory equilibria con-
sidered have very diﬀerent causes of discrimination and therefore also very
diﬀerent policy implications. It is therefore important to consider whether
it is actually possible to empirically distinguish the two cases. In this sec-
tion we will use a simple econometric analysis to test the main implication
of the coordination failure equilibria: Groups with identical human capital
distributions would face identical wage setting schedules. Hence, contrary
to previous empirical studies of discrimination, like for example Trejo (1997)
and O’Neill (1992), we will not only relate an individual’s wage to their own
human capital level but also to the distribution of human capital in the group
they belong to.
Contrary to the coordination failure theory of discrimination, all other
theories assume that groups face diﬀerent market conditions that cause these
groups to end up in diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes. This would imply that,
even when groups have the same human capital distribution, these diﬀerent
market forces would always cause these groups to end up in a discriminatory
15situation. The coordination failure theory, however, suggests that, because
groups are identical and face similar market conditions, if they would have the
same human capital distribution then they would end up in the same equi-
librium and face identical wage setting schedules. This suggests a testable
null hypothesis. We could test for the existence of a coordination failure by
testing whether if two groups would have same human capital distribution
they would face same wage setting schedule. We can think of this as assum-
ing that the standard log wage regression, w
j
i = α · X
j
i , used by employers
to compensate worker i of group j for his productivity, would be a function
not only of his individual characteristics, but also of the human capital dis-





i , where Zj is a vector of characteristics of the group to which
the worker belongs. The later is what we refer to as the augmented model
while we refer to the former as the standard model. If we calculate diﬀer-
ences in the wage schedules according to the standard model, and then we
repeat the exercise with the augmented model, we would expect to extract
the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients with those of the human capital distribu-
tions, which in short implies that diﬀerences in wage schedules found with
the augmented model should be lower.
Our empirical analysis consists of ﬁve parts. In the ﬁrst part we describe
the data, taken from the Current Population Survey, that we use for our
analysis. We then proceed, in the second subsection, by estimating a separate
log wage equation for both black and white males for each year in our sample,
i.e. 1964-1998. Following Trejo (1997), we use these estimates to assess
w h i c hp a r to ft h el o gw a g ed i ﬀ e r e n c e si sc a u s e db yt h ed i ﬀ e r e n c e si nt h e
coeﬃcients in the wage equations. Similar to Trejo, we ﬁnd that at the
beginning of the period, about 75% of the diﬀerence in average log wages
are caused by the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients instead of the diﬀerences in
human capital levels, while at the end, notably during the 90s, it accounted
for less than 50% of it. In the third subsection, we introduce an augmented
wage regression which, following the theory of statistical discrimination, tries
to explain the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients of the wage schedule from the
diﬀerences in the human capital distributions of the two groups. The results
that we obtain with this augmented wage regression seem to be at odds with
the coordination failure theory of discrimination. In the following section we
turn to a maximum likelihood estimation in other to account for potential
biases with the OLS estimations. Finally, we discuss the limitations of our
methodology and possible extensions.
164.1 Data
For our analysis we have used data from the Census Bureau’s Current Popu-
lation Surveys uniform March ﬁles for the years 1964-19988. The data cover
information on yearly salaries and wages, potential experience and education
for black and white males aged 25-68.
We use the log of hourly earnings in our estimations9 Unfortunately, the
data on salaries and wages are topcoded at $50000 and thus we have to limit
our analysis to men with wages and salaries smaller than this ceiling level for
the OLS estimations. We do it though, after converting the dollars of each
year to dollars of 1981 in order to get comparable samples from year to year.
As it has become standard, we construct potential experience as age minus
the number of years of education completed minus six, while education is
simply the number of years of education completed. We consider the sample
of men. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables considered
for both groups during the period analyzed.
4.2 Standard log wage regression
For our standard log wage regressions we will follow Trejo (1997)and explain
a person’s wages and salaries as a function of his experience and education10.
In particular, we will consider a regression of the form






βjgtdijgt + uigt (6)
where wigt denotes yearly wages and salaries (reported)in period t of person
i from group g, where g ∈{ black,white}. In particular, xi1gt is a dummy
8The data used in this paper for the period 1964-1988 were made available by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Researchand were originally col-
lected by Mare and Winship (1990). Data for the period 1989-1998 can be found at
ftp://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/cps/march_suppl/data/
Neither the collectors not the ICPSR bear any responsibility for the analysis presented
here.
9Since before 1976 weeks worked per year are not available, we use the information
available about the worker being a full or part year worker to assign diﬀerent number of
weeks a year to these two groups.
10We also include a vector of control variables, suchas dummy variables for marital
status, class of worker (working for a public ﬁrm or not), region where he lives and central
city metropolitan statistical area status. See the tables for a detailed description.
17variable for individuals with incomplete high school, i.e., with less than 12
years of education, xi2gt is a dummy variable for individuals with incomplete
college, i.e., with more than 12 and less than 16 years of education, xi3gt
is a dummy variable for individuals with college or more, i.e., with more
than 16 years of education, xi4gt is potential experience and xi5gt is potential
experience squared. Finally, dijgt are the dummy variables included.
The results of these regressions for the years 1964-1998 for both, black
and white males, are reported in table 2. From this table it can be seen that
the estimated coeﬃcients vary both over time and between blacks and whites.
In order to assess the extent of discrimination in our sample we consider the
following decomposition of the diﬀerences in average log wages between the
































where the ﬁrst term in brackets on the right hand side denotes the part
of the diﬀerence in the average log wages that is caused by diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients of the estimated wage equations and the second term is the
part caused by the diﬀerences in human capital levels. Trejo (1997)reports
for 1979 and 1989 that for Mexican American most of the average wage
diﬀerentials can be explained by the second term, i.e. diﬀerences in human
capital levels. According to our results, as we mentioned, when comparing
whites with black males the ﬁrst part seems to explain about 75% of the
diﬀerential at the beginning of the period and less than 50% at the end as
it is illustrated in ﬁgure 6. It is remarkable the reduction in the relative
importance of the diﬀerences caused by the coeﬃcients in explaining log
wage diﬀerences. They are though, statistically signiﬁcant from zero all the
years. Since our estimation does not consider factors diﬃcult to account for
as family environment, neighborhoods, unobserved ability and others, the
results found in our estimation suggest that the contribution to the log wage
diﬀerential due to the wage schedules might be substantially overestimated11.
11For example, the survey does not allow to distinguish high school graduates from re-
cipients of a General Equivalence Certiﬁcate -GED-. In particular, Cameron and Heckman
(1993) ﬁnd that earnings of GED recipients is comparable to that of high school dropouts,
18This result is in accordance with previous literature which consider that labor
market discrimination is not any more the major source of the disparity in
earnings between blacks and whites, as pointed out by Heckman (1998). We
consider though, that the mentioned reduction in importance should not
lead to a relaxation of civil rights laws, which have proven eﬀective after the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as shown in our results, where can be
appreciated how the large part of the reduction in the wage diﬀerential took
place roughly during the ﬁrst decade analyzed, i.e. from 1964 until 1965,
period which followed the passage of the mentioned Act. This point have
been previously made by Donohue and Heckman (1991).
4.3 Augmented log wage regression
From the standard wage regressions we obtained that the coeﬃcients in the
estimated wage setting schedule for black males are very diﬀerent from those
of white males. It is thus important to consider a theory that explains why
these diﬀerences occur. In this section we introduce the augmented model,
by which the productivity of individual i which belongs to group j is assessed
according to w
j
i = α(Zj) · X
j
i , where Zj is a vector of characteristics of the
group to which the worker belongs. We expect to extract the diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients with those of the human capital distributions, which in short
implies that diﬀerences in wage schedules found with the augmented model
should be lower.
The purpose of the augmented wage regression presented here is to try to
explain the diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients presented in table 2 from
diﬀerences in the shape and evolution of the human capital distributions of
the black and white males in our sample. This, oﬀ course, means that we
implicitly assume that employers base their expectations on a person belong-
ing to the population of men from which we have selected our sample. A
more advanced empirical analysis would preferably consider the joint human
capital distribution for all black and white males. Our approach though,
follows the assumptions of our theoretical model which does not rely on any
kind of complementarities between the groups.
Similar to the previous subsection we consider potential experience and
education as the main indicators of human capital and will thus consider
which will contribute to increase the wage diﬀerential for high school graduates in our
sample.
19the distribution of human capital levels as the joint distribution of these two
variables. Figures 7 to 10 depict the evolution of the marginal distributions of
both education and experience for the black and white males in our sample.
It is clear that during the analyzed period blacks caught up signiﬁcantly
in both characteristics, so that their distributions are converging. Let eigt
denote education and xigt experience of person i in group g in period t.T h e n



































where ngt is the number of individuals in our sample for group g in period
t. Clearly the sample moments µrs
gt are consistent estimates of population
moments mrs
gt,a sl o n ga st h e ye x i s t .
We will now present the augmented wage regression assuming that the
coeﬃcients β depend linearly on the (cross)-moments of the ﬁrst, second and













Since we have to approximate the population moments mrs
gt with their sample
counterparts µrs












gt + εpgt with E [εpgt]=0
Substituting this in the standard wage equation (6)we obtain the following



















12Since in a previous exercise perfomed with (cross)-moments of the ﬁrst, second and
third order we got a poor result due to multicollinearity, we estimate the model with only


































































ωigt = xigt ⊗ µgt
we can rewrite this equation as
lnwigt = ω

igtzg + vigt (7)
Two things are key when considering the estimation of (7). First, in or-
der for the estimates of the parameter vector zg to be consistent, it must
hold that E [ωigtvigt]=0 . A suﬃcient condition would be that εpgt and uigt
are independent of the explanatory variables, xigt, and the sample moments,
µgt. Additionally to the well known criticism to the standard log wage re-
gression that uigt might be positively correlated with unobserved skills that
also positively aﬀect a persons education level, xi3gt, the above assumptions
also imply that the measurement errors εpgt in the sample moments are also
independent of the observations on the basis of which they are estimated.
Although in the following we will make the assumptions described above and
will use ordinary least squares to estimate (7), we are well aware that an
instrumental variable estimation might be considered more appropriate.
The second econometric issue to consider in estimating (7)is that we
consider a sequence of cross-sections, i.e. i =1 ,...,n gt and t =1 ,...,T,a n d
that, contrary to standard cross section techniques, our parameter estimates
are only consistent whenever both ngt and t go to inﬁnity. This is the case
because we need to observe both an inﬁnite number of individuals to estimate
t h es a m p l em o m e n t sµrs
gt consistently and observe the wage setting schedule
21for an inﬁnite number of diﬀerent human capital distributions in order to
estimate the dependence of the wage setting schedule on the distribution
consistently.
In our application we have used real salaries and wages in 1981 dollars as
dependent variables and added a deterministic trend as a proxy for techno-
logical change causing real wage increases over time.
Table 4 contains the estimation result for equation (7)for both black
and white males for the period 1964-1998 using only the second moments of
education and experience, avoiding this way the problems caused by multi-
collinearity perceived in table 3. The coordination failure theory of discrim-
ination would suggest that zb = zw, which, as can be easily seen from table
4, is clearly not the case. Just as for the standard log wage regression we use
(7)to decompose the average log wage diﬀerences into a part explained by
parameter diﬀerences and a part explained by diﬀerences in average human
capital levels (and average residuals), i.e.
(lnwwt) − (lnwbt)=ω





bt)zb +( vwt − vbt) (8)
Hence, since the coordination failure theory of discrimination predicts that
zb = zw, it would imply that the part of the average log wage diﬀerences
caused by diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients, i.e. ω
wt(zw − zb), is zero. However,
as can be seen from ﬁgure 12, for almost every period ω
wt (zw − zb) seems
to exceed the part caused by coeﬃcient diﬀerences found on the basis of the
standard log wage regression in ﬁgure 11. Thus, our results seem to suggest
that, after correcting for possible statistical discrimination, discrimination
due to other causes seems to be more severe than when not correcting for it.
This is completely the opposite result from what is predicted by the theory
of discrimination as a coordination failure which would suggest that the only
cause of discrimination is statistical.
However, one has to be careful interpreting the above results. There are
several grounds that might lead to possible biases in the analysis presented
above. They can be basically put in three categories: (i)sample selection
bias and truncation due to topcoding of earnings, (ii)model speciﬁcation,
and (iii)estimation issues.
Sample selection bias almost certainly occurs in our sample, because we
have only selected employees with total earnings below $50,000. If one would
believe in a theory of statistical discrimination then one of the questions is
with which group are (potential)employees identiﬁed. Suppose that our
22simple speciﬁcation in (7)was actually correct but that the males in our
sample were not only judged on their human capital distribution but on
that of all males of their ethnic group. In that case, our sample selection,
implies that we ignore the fact that the black males in our sample are actually
associated with a group of men that has a high unemployment rate and lower
human capital levels than represented by the human capital distribution used
in our empirical analysis.
The speciﬁcation of (7)is ad hoc and not directly based on any microeco-
nomic foundations. In particular, it is hard to believe that the resulting wage
equation coeﬃcients are a simple linear function of the moments of the un-
derlying human capital distribution. Furthermore, the proxies that we have
used for human capital levels, i.e. education and potential experience, might
not accurately reﬂect the characteristics on the basis of which employers form
their expectations. Anyway, what our analysis suggests is that any empiri-
cal analysis that considers the possibility of statistical discrimination should
include the possibility of the coeﬃcients in the wage equation depending on
group wide characteristics.
Finally, there are some practical econometric issues that complicate the
estimation of (7). First, there is the possible correlation of the residuals with
the explanatory variables that might cause inconsistency of our estimates,
as discussed above. Secondly, even if a linear speciﬁcation as the one we
use is correct, there still remains the question of how accurately the sample
moments we selected capture the distribution of human capital in each group.
4.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
In this section we present a model that correct both the selectivity problems
due to the participation decision in the labor market and the truncation in
the standard log wage regression. Consistent results with those obtained by
OLS would, arguably, suﬃce to consider the results of the previous models
reliable.
The Model
We use a model with two equations with latent variables which incorpo-
rates elements of the models found in Heckman (1974)and Hausman and
Wise (1977):
h
∗ = α0 + α1 · w + Z · α + eh
23w
∗ = β0 + X · β + ew










if h∗ > 0,w ∗ + h∗ ≥ L
y = w = h =0
	
if h∗ ≤ 0
(eh,e w)˜N (0,0,σ h,σ w,ρ)
where h is the log of the number of hours worked last year, y is the log
of total earnings per year and w is the log of total earnings per hour. Z
includes variables like other income, spouse’s income and number of persons
in household under age 18. Variables in X are the same as those included in
the standard log wage regression.
The reduced form of the hours equation is
h
∗ = R · γ + v
where R =[ 1 XZ ],γ =[ α0 + α1β0 α1β
 α]
 , and v =
α1ew + eh.
We estimate the model for each group by Full Information Maximum



























j = B,W.The sets Ψ
j
i, i =0 ,1,2, represent the sets of people who do
not work (i =0 ) , work and have y<L(i =1 ) ,a n dw o r ka n dh a v ey ≥ L
(i =2 ). Φ and φ are the distribution and density functions of the normal
distribution, f (h,w) is the bivariate normal distribution of h and w, f (h,y)
is the bivariate normal distribution of h and y,a n df (y∗|h) is the density of
y∗ conditional on h.
The source of bias can be appreciated from the fact that we only observe
w and h conditional on their being positive in the case of the hours of work,
and when h is positive and y is less than L i nt h ec a s eo fw.
24Below we describe the diﬀerent components of the log wage diﬀerence in
this case, and point at those which we will focus on.
Wage Decomposition







































The diﬀerence due to the diﬀerent wage schedules of the two groups is
(βB0 − βW0)+XW (βB − βW)






And ﬁnally, the remaining term, [E (uB|ΩB) − E (uW|ΩW)] is due to se-
lectivity. This decomposition, which diﬀers to the previously presented only
by the term involving selection, was also used previously by Schafgans (1998)
to evaluate ethnic wage diﬀerences. Here, we will fucus only in the compo-
nent due to the coeﬃcients in order to compare it with our result with the
OLS estimation.
The results of the estimation are presented in table 5 and the decompo-
sition of the log wage diﬀerential in ﬁgure 13. Figure 14 contrasts the two
decompositions. With the exception of some years, the share of the log wage
diﬀerential explained by the coeﬃcients is very close in both cases. Years
where substantial diﬀerences emerge are more likely due to problems in the
estimation for the quality of the additional data used in the FIML estimation,
which we expect to ﬁx in the near future.
Since these results support those obtained in the standard model using
OLS, estimates of the augmented model are very likely to be supported as well
by a FIML estimation, for which we consider that the problem of selection
does not aﬀect our previous conclusions.
25There still remain the limitations due to our model speciﬁcation, and
the previously mentioned econometric issues as possible ways to improve the
model and get additional evidence of whether the theory of discrimination
as a coordination failure, is ad odds with evidence, as we conclude with our
empirical model.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have shown, using a simple model of statistical discrimina-
tion, that groups with equal productive endowments might end up in equilib-
ria in which they get diﬀerent average wages. This might be possible because
of the existence of multiple equilibria. These equilibria exist, because, in a
world of imperfect information, an individual is not only judged on his own
merits but also on those of the group he belongs to. If an individuals in-
centives to invest in his own productivity is increasing in the groups average
investment level, then this mechanism causes a strategic complementarity
that might be strong enough to accommodate multiple equilibria.
However, a simple econometric analysis suggests that average wage diﬀer-
entials between black and white men are not solely caused by the coordina-
tion failure theory of discrimination, which relies on the possibility of multiple
equilibria in a model with ex-ante identical agents. The results showed that
wage diﬀerentials would be larger, once we accounted for statistical discrim-
ination. Before taking the empirical results in this paper for granted, and
designating them as “stylized facts”, a careful analysis of the eﬀects of model
speciﬁcation and possibly worthwhile, some econometric reﬁnements, might
be necessary to verify our results.
On a theoretical level, it would be worthwhile to consider a model of
statistical discrimination in which there is also strategic interaction between
various groups in the economy, as for example done by Frijters (1997), Moro
and Norman (1996)and Moro (1998) , rather than considering the case in
which each group behaves completely independently of the other.
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29A Proofs of propositions
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :From (4)it is immediately clear that  β =0is a ﬁxed
point, no matter which parameter values are considered.






























Since γ ∈ (0,1) we ﬁnd that η ∈ (−1,∞). Furthermore it can be easily seen
that for all values of η the function g(.) is continuous and diﬀerentiable with
derivative g (β)=ηβ
η−1 −(η +1 )β
η and g(1) = 0. We can now distinguish





which implies η ∈ (−1,0), (ii) γ = 1
3 which implies





which implies η ∈ (0,∞).I nc a s e(i) we ﬁnd that
lim
β↓0
g(β)=∞ and g < 0, which implies that there is a unique  β ∈ (0,1]







< 1. Finally, in case (iii) we know that g(0) = g(1) = 0 and that
























= A then  β is the unique






<Athen (10)has two solutions. This is depicted
in ﬁgure 5. Notice that 1 >A>0, which implies that for multiple equilibria
we need σ2
ε <  σ2
a.




























:( 0 ,1) → +. Also in this case, it can be easily seen that for all

















ε,G(1) = 0.W e











which implies η ∈ (0,∞).I nc a s e(i) we ﬁnd that G < 0,∀β,
which implies that there is a unique  β ∈ (0,1) that solves (11). In case (ii)




this case, there is always an inﬂection point at β
i =
η
η+2, so that the function
is always initially decreasing and concave upwards and for values of β larger
than β
i concave downwards as depicted in ﬁgure 5.A. Given this shape, de-
pending upon de magnitude of the concavity, the function will intersect the
diagonal either one, two or three times. Assume there exist β1 and β2 such
that β1 <
η
η+2 <β 2,G  (β1)=1 , and G (β2)=1 . The function will in-
tersect the diagonal three times whenever G(β1) <β 1, and G(β2) >β 2.
If G(β2)=β2 or G(β1)=β1 it will intersect it twice, otherwise, it will
intersect it only once. That there exists such a combination of parameters
is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.A where the function has three equilibria, and we
selected  σ
2
a =2 0 ,σ2
ε =4 ,σ 2
b =0 .15, and γ =1 /2.
31Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables
Black Males
Year 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
IHS 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.37 0.37
0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48
IC 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16
0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.37
C+ 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
0.24 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.32
X/100 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
X2/10000 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
Spouse 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.76
0.32 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.43
Nspouse 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14
0.25 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35
Private 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78
0.39 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.41
South 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.58 0.58
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49
City 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50
0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or
never married. Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
First line has the mean of the variable and the second its standard deviation.Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables. (Continuation)
Black Males
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
IHS 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13
0.48 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34
IC 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.28
0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45
C+ 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.18
0.32 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38
X/100 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22
0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
X2/10000 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Spouse 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54
0.43 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Nspouse 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18
0.35 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39
Private 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.79
0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.41
South 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.55
0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
City 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.48
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or
never married. Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
First line has the mean of the variable and the second its standard deviation.Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables. (Continuation)
White Males
Year 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
IHS 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20
0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.40
IC 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18
0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38
C+ 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.25
0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.43
X/100 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
X2/10000 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Spouse 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.87
0.26 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.33
Nspouse 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
0.16 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.24
Private 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83
0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38
South 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28
0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
City 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18
0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or
never married. Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
First line has the mean of the variable and the second its standard deviation.Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables. (Continuation)
White Males
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
IHS 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33
IC 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27
0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44
C+ 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.26
0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.44
X/100 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
X2/10000 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Spouse 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.69
0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
Nspouse 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35
Private 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36
South 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.28
0.45 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45
City 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21
0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.41
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or
never married. Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
First line has the mean of the variable and the second its standard deviation.Table 2. Estimated coefficients of the standard log wage regression.
Black Males
Year 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
Constant 1.674 1.716 1.637 1.565 1.650 1.732 1.787 1.862 1.758 1.651 1.709 1.800 1.781 1.740 1.659 1.814 1.507 1.641
* 18.175 19.653 23.723 17.277 26.322 27.408 26.045 29.931 28.043 22.610 24.697 26.661 26.227 31.983 28.997 28.118 27.202 29.675
IHS -0.106 -0.043 -0.086 -0.101 -0.094 -0.092 -0.097 -0.080 -0.045 -0.108 -0.202 -0.116 -0.098 -0.106 -0.125 -0.146 -0.136 -0.229
-2.539 -1.196 -3.627 -3.539 -4.467 -4.225 -4.470 -3.558 -1.953 -4.737 -8.724 -4.014 -3.580 -4.611 -4.785 -5.907 -5.301 -10.000
IC 0.149 -0.024 0.070 0.121 0.104 0.102 0.069 0.071 0.052 0.040 0.028 0.042 0.066 0.029 0.068 0.027 0.097 0.073
2.785 -0.388 1.721 2.274 2.753 2.813 2.161 2.231 1.277 1.160 0.801 1.287 2.021 1.054 2.163 0.792 3.760 2.878
C+ 0.217 0.246 0.271 0.236 0.233 0.225 0.145 0.235 0.255 0.268 0.220 0.173 0.166 0.271 0.373 0.264 0.314 0.156
3.535 4.753 5.184 3.217 5.420 5.213 3.406 5.582 6.257 5.047 6.036 4.040 3.450 8.429 11.773 6.657 9.035 4.741
X/100 0.626 0.195 0.886 1.512 1.482 1.280 0.791 1.202 1.164 1.673 1.724 2.038 1.807 1.668 2.409 1.527 2.630 2.241
1.195 0.408 2.815 3.548 4.928 4.329 2.492 3.942 3.554 4.779 4.508 5.460 4.930 5.352 7.025 4.448 7.752 6.351
X2/10000 -1.371 -0.590 -1.070 -2.898 -3.099 -2.456 -1.906 -2.653 -2.755 -2.875 -3.056 -4.249 -3.254 -3.227 -4.588 -3.063 -5.293 -3.993
-1.541 -0.720 -2.078 -4.107 -6.249 -5.091 -3.491 -5.203 -4.835 -4.766 -4.389 -6.553 -4.995 -5.763 -7.637 -5.123 -8.574 -5.968
Spouse 0.168 0.186 0.163 0.217 0.215 0.184 0.252 0.153 0.263 0.271 0.181 0.129 0.119 0.214 0.149 0.253 0.258 0.215
2.652 3.198 3.147 3.484 4.398 4.276 4.887 3.444 6.119 5.495 3.623 2.649 2.363 5.724 3.779 5.521 7.119 6.119
Nspouse 0.082 0.080 0.082 0.174 0.108 0.077 0.134 0.007 0.195 0.154 0.083 0.019 0.070 0.135 0.026 0.099 0.178 0.105
0.847 1.013 1.358 2.377 1.922 1.520 2.126 0.122 3.616 2.652 1.343 0.311 1.139 3.004 0.553 1.836 4.045 2.380
Private -0.048 -0.095 -0.107 -0.066 -0.060 -0.052 -0.031 -0.076 -0.097 -0.072 -0.004 0.026 -0.055 -0.092 -0.046 -0.083 -0.023 -0.082
-1.607 -3.095 -4.812 -2.290 -3.227 -2.453 -1.542 -3.908 -4.704 -2.979 -0.211 1.092 -2.432 -4.708 -2.201 -3.456 -1.032 -4.116
South -0.416 -0.412 -0.406 -0.412 -0.334 -0.350 -0.309 -0.321 -0.293 -0.233 -0.181 -0.206 -0.236 -0.211 -0.133 -0.226 -0.140 -0.146
-14.195 -15.270 -22.087 -16.967 -18.152 -19.000 -17.240 -18.314 -15.103 -11.038 -8.597 -9.048 -10.995 -11.202 -6.348 -10.570 -7.102 -8.066
City 0.131 0.170 0.177 0.189 0.104 0.101 0.085 0.116 0.107 0.106 0.141 0.055 0.147 0.107 0.086 0.031 0.098 0.063
4.357 6.032 9.234 7.458 5.658 5.412 4.630 6.576 5.317 4.981 6.488 2.353 6.774 5.821 4.184 1.462 5.026 3.517
N 1,833 1,992 4,185 2,635 3,928 3,841 3,707 3,629 3,362 3,107 3,006 2,697 2,881 3,341 3,387 3,247 3,622 3,622
RSQ 0.193 0.185 0.191 0.217 0.189 0.180 0.152 0.204 0.172 0.140 0.140 0.108 0.129 0.148 0.123 0.127 0.127 0.129
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or never married.
Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
* t statistics.Table 2. Estimated coefficients of the standard log wage regression. (Continuation)
Black Males
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Constant 1.641 1.743 1.650 1.563 1.477 1.587 1.522 1.509 1.390 1.498 1.360 1.442 1.405 1.419 1.424 1.440 1.593 1.519
* 29.675 29.697 28.550 25.369 25.593 29.721 29.719 26.748 22.939 24.879 23.729 22.998 23.648 21.758 22.215 20.715 22.026 22.078
IHS -0.229 -0.171 -0.119 -0.224 -0.206 -0.124 -0.114 -0.125 -0.188 -0.225 -0.171 -0.183 -0.185 -0.138 -0.092 -0.253 -0.197 -0.232
-10.000 -6.718 -4.510 -8.436 -7.814 -4.429 -4.274 -4.679 -5.606 -6.414 -4.994 -5.220 -5.431 -3.673 -1.964 -6.376 -5.070 -5.363
IC 0.073 0.027 0.108 0.154 0.112 0.124 0.114 0.133 0.182 0.131 0.191 0.116 0.176 0.212 0.193 0.138 0.171 0.174
2.878 1.019 3.724 5.144 3.869 4.909 4.469 4.978 5.600 4.500 6.318 3.866 6.234 7.500 6.503 4.505 5.687 5.692
C+ 0.156 0.235 0.246 0.338 0.378 0.393 0.288 0.361 0.369 0.398 0.413 0.406 0.458 0.487 0.393 0.445 0.328 0.373
4.741 6.357 7.269 9.871 12.770 13.473 9.763 10.877 10.146 11.833 12.135 10.341 13.710 13.909 11.068 10.674 8.609 10.103
X/100 2.241 1.086 2.175 2.364 2.597 2.471 3.679 2.609 3.400 2.836 3.032 2.251 2.458 2.049 2.830 2.351 1.315 1.803
6.351 2.834 6.340 5.805 7.617 6.688 10.310 7.228 7.960 7.117 7.415 5.150 5.566 4.038 6.103 4.926 2.488 3.618
X2/10000 -3.993 -2.151 -4.085 -3.349 -3.949 -3.843 -6.593 -4.278 -5.359 -4.136 -4.729 -3.259 -3.222 -2.858 -4.282 -2.830 -1.244 -2.285
-5.968 -3.037 -6.799 -4.606 -6.445 -5.276 -9.497 -6.335 -6.747 -5.379 -6.083 -3.900 -3.726 -2.946 -4.827 -3.092 -1.212 -2.290
Spouse 0.215 0.212 0.135 0.104 0.163 0.127 0.188 0.197 0.209 0.197 0.220 0.257 0.207 0.228 0.167 0.189 0.164 0.139
6.119 5.905 3.599 2.623 5.031 4.233 6.277 6.281 6.396 6.933 7.493 8.467 7.477 7.648 5.057 5.544 5.213 4.444
Nspouse 0.105 0.118 0.080 0.060 0.092 0.033 0.050 0.134 0.036 0.009 0.110 0.137 0.107 0.058 0.044 0.074 0.089 0.047
2.380 2.517 1.675 1.259 2.217 0.847 1.274 3.253 0.896 0.247 2.928 3.674 2.959 1.514 1.073 1.829 2.279 1.168
Private -0.082 -0.080 -0.041 -0.017 -0.035 -0.053 -0.081 -0.113 -0.046 -0.097 -0.058 -0.089 -0.059 -0.064 -0.098 -0.087 -0.111 -0.056
-4.116 -3.712 -1.888 -0.677 -1.559 -2.453 -3.941 -5.027 -1.652 -3.511 -2.133 -2.960 -2.215 -2.370 -3.375 -2.844 -3.716 -1.780
South -0.146 -0.141 -0.143 -0.149 -0.113 -0.137 -0.189 -0.121 -0.215 -0.208 -0.197 -0.176 -0.214 -0.164 -0.135 -0.127 -0.119 -0.057
-8.066 -7.000 -6.937 -6.817 -5.367 -7.093 -9.732 -6.005 -8.677 -9.043 -8.255 -7.205 -9.017 -6.949 -5.430 -4.926 -4.772 -2.245
City 0.063 0.058 0.059 0.028 0.022 -0.020 -0.047 0.020 0.031 -0.014 0.044 0.008 -0.018 -0.007 -0.027 -0.046 -0.018 -0.042
3.517 2.885 2.896 1.284 1.082 -1.041 -2.412 1.005 1.269 -0.622 1.889 0.332 -0.796 -0.280 -1.087 -1.783 -0.738 -1.687
N 3,622 3,280 3,160 3,326 3,407 3,523 3,551 3,475 2,201 2,532 2,485 2,490 2,420 2,252 2,324 2,014 2,108 2,078
RSQ 0.129 0.102 0.092 0.118 0.124 0.112 0.134 0.118 0.179 0.182 0.175 0.160 0.196 0.196 0.131 0.171 0.122 0.120
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or never married.
Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
* t statistics.Table 2. Estimated coefficients of the standard log wage regression. (Continuation)
White Males
Year 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
Constant 1.728 1.631 1.632 1.734 1.669 1.848 1.813 1.805 1.788 1.774 1.757 1.584 1.645 1.746 1.625 1.652 1.583 1.480
* 27.824 25.318 24.244 26.557 31.422 29.104 33.379 27.384 30.357 26.316 28.753 26.056 30.064 34.109 30.492 31.529 32.774 29.667
IHS -0.120 -0.126 -0.186 -0.163 -0.165 -0.148 -0.120 -0.146 -0.129 -0.120 -0.175 -0.152 -0.205 -0.190 -0.199 -0.190 -0.181 -0.174
-5.733 -5.976 -9.113 -7.679 -8.930 -7.541 -6.040 -6.952 -6.450 -5.416 -8.159 -6.351 -9.549 -8.939 -9.110 -8.464 -7.785 -7.446
IC 0.096 0.116 0.111 0.058 0.090 0.092 0.064 0.075 0.066 0.081 0.066 0.094 0.054 0.059 0.095 0.024 0.088 0.067
3.194 3.785 4.387 2.028 3.826 3.407 2.819 2.888 2.838 3.219 2.809 3.774 2.357 2.677 4.198 1.090 3.789 2.917
C+ 0.203 0.164 0.237 0.234 0.228 0.245 0.232 0.200 0.212 0.236 0.194 0.209 0.295 0.230 0.249 0.208 0.232 0.196
6.604 5.236 7.983 8.471 8.961 9.475 9.070 8.130 8.510 9.077 8.143 8.790 13.031 10.479 11.116 9.262 10.171 9.093
X/100 1.609 2.057 2.575 1.744 2.057 1.718 1.950 2.134 2.247 2.376 2.124 3.103 3.287 3.263 3.092 2.978 2.700 2.837
5.309 6.225 7.940 5.250 7.386 5.680 6.696 6.898 7.644 7.843 6.324 9.181 10.945 11.503 9.945 10.073 8.957 9.290
X2/10000 -2.879 -3.576 -4.672 -3.125 -3.621 -2.986 -3.650 -4.104 -4.045 -4.300 -3.523 -5.517 -5.683 -5.783 -5.368 -5.126 -4.508 -5.185
-5.123 -5.877 -7.799 -4.988 -7.057 -5.180 -6.525 -6.955 -7.176 -7.387 -5.197 -8.075 -9.474 -10.458 -8.655 -8.647 -7.577 -8.501
Spouse 0.217 0.269 0.250 0.256 0.293 0.170 0.234 0.253 0.227 0.235 0.281 0.307 0.227 0.107 0.256 0.194 0.183 0.325
4.465 5.329 4.620 5.126 6.689 3.300 5.087 4.473 4.857 4.360 5.772 6.093 4.869 2.644 6.083 4.370 4.859 8.072
Nspouse 0.256 0.123 0.205 0.210 0.152 0.038 0.191 0.175 0.078 0.100 0.205 0.154 0.115 0.021 0.175 0.072 0.110 0.240
3.726 1.538 2.710 2.460 2.381 0.525 3.053 2.432 1.241 1.383 3.212 2.455 1.860 0.372 2.746 1.234 2.113 4.624
Private -0.031 -0.032 -0.021 0.015 -0.010 -0.019 -0.013 -0.018 -0.014 -0.027 -0.017 -0.001 -0.033 -0.031 -0.049 -0.005 0.024 -0.001
-1.527 -1.394 -0.976 0.760 -0.526 -0.980 -0.650 -0.902 -0.746 -1.244 -0.850 -0.043 -1.675 -1.716 -2.490 -0.293 1.270 -0.059
South -0.207 -0.186 -0.189 -0.195 -0.162 -0.153 -0.164 -0.193 -0.195 -0.134 -0.135 -0.117 -0.121 -0.106 -0.066 -0.088 -0.092 -0.082
-10.132 -8.548 -9.953 -9.760 -8.967 -8.193 -9.168 -10.132 -10.356 -6.979 -7.436 -6.115 -6.831 -5.829 -3.756 -5.011 -5.055 -4.508
City 0.077 0.071 0.058 0.071 0.065 0.063 0.013 0.004 0.036 0.042 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.027 0.059 0.036 0.021 0.012
4.491 3.796 3.165 3.797 3.988 3.645 0.764 0.234 2.100 2.215 0.326 -0.010 0.730 1.443 2.960 1.875 1.060 0.636
N 4,428 4,423 4,477 4,566 4,510 4,575 4,481 4,365 4,377 4,304 4,436 4,104 5,029 5,051 4,924 5,024 5,109 5,000
RSQ 0.076 0.071 0.115 0.085 0.108 0.085 0.084 0.093 0.094 0.077 0.078 0.089 0.112 0.088 0.098 0.077 0.072 0.086
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or never married.
Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
* t statistics.Table 2. Estimated coefficients of the standard log wage regression. (Continuation)
White Males
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Constant 1.480 1.527 1.601 1.598 1.609 1.622 1.527 1.591 1.543 1.484 1.534 1.489 1.475 1.452 1.494 1.402 1.473 1.473
* 29.667 30.483 31.948 31.035 33.107 32.907 29.877 32.659 37.552 35.766 33.575 35.969 33.595 31.021 33.196 30.676 31.675 31.823
IHS -0.174 -0.192 -0.226 -0.261 -0.250 -0.199 -0.231 -0.238 -0.304 -0.235 -0.312 -0.287 -0.275 -0.278 -0.289 -0.314 -0.300 -0.323
-7.446 -7.757 -8.611 -10.160 -9.378 -7.300 -8.423 -8.315 -11.615 -9.306 -12.004 -10.177 -10.392 -9.751 -10.087 -11.453 -10.806 -11.904
IC 0.067 0.108 0.116 0.066 0.063 0.082 0.155 0.126 0.112 0.142 0.127 0.133 0.147 0.089 0.126 0.121 0.134 0.127
2.917 4.856 4.680 2.740 2.615 3.622 6.694 5.267 5.091 6.781 5.981 6.592 7.308 4.237 5.763 5.865 6.634 5.921
C+ 0.196 0.217 0.248 0.291 0.278 0.269 0.359 0.334 0.334 0.376 0.351 0.390 0.396 0.399 0.380 0.381 0.360 0.369
9.093 9.709 10.916 12.911 12.397 12.241 16.854 14.667 16.307 18.624 16.870 18.158 18.481 18.553 18.114 16.561 16.662 16.991
X/100 2.837 3.277 2.394 2.609 2.715 3.058 2.632 3.055 2.703 2.797 2.446 2.490 2.166 2.414 2.342 2.941 2.420 2.594
9.290 10.403 7.419 7.445 8.216 8.749 8.181 8.950 9.087 9.034 7.151 8.169 6.858 7.350 7.097 9.301 7.322 7.857
X2/10000 -5.185 -5.446 -3.882 -3.758 -4.472 -5.156 -4.104 -4.913 -4.242 -4.590 -3.795 -3.813 -3.334 -3.609 -3.270 -4.640 -3.713 -4.231
-8.501 -8.569 -6.102 -5.238 -6.933 -7.178 -6.353 -7.097 -7.276 -7.379 -5.458 -6.232 -5.377 -5.472 -4.957 -7.437 -5.474 -6.319
Spouse 0.325 0.200 0.241 0.130 0.210 0.187 0.236 0.139 0.192 0.201 0.200 0.257 0.269 0.246 0.226 0.210 0.187 0.200
8.072 5.015 6.719 3.587 6.355 5.436 6.373 4.313 7.539 8.598 8.350 10.807 10.675 9.915 9.032 8.877 7.991 8.286
Nspouse 0.240 0.146 0.253 0.104 0.115 0.038 0.174 0.033 0.082 0.056 0.080 0.122 0.120 0.139 0.098 0.102 0.088 0.081
4.624 2.942 4.827 2.192 2.491 0.841 3.709 0.731 2.414 1.706 2.484 3.935 3.673 4.110 2.852 2.974 2.691 2.566
Private -0.001 0.009 -0.022 -0.019 -0.044 -0.056 -0.024 -0.044 -0.032 -0.030 -0.057 -0.086 -0.059 -0.057 -0.101 -0.047 -0.045 -0.045
-0.059 0.446 -1.052 -0.945 -2.265 -2.700 -1.172 -2.047 -1.536 -1.508 -2.586 -4.100 -2.763 -2.500 -4.131 -2.052 -1.883 -1.846
South -0.082 -0.095 -0.031 -0.036 -0.074 -0.083 -0.088 -0.089 -0.067 -0.038 -0.057 -0.096 -0.109 -0.076 -0.055 -0.057 -0.051 -0.041
-4.508 -5.037 -1.589 -1.935 -3.989 -4.412 -4.883 -4.582 -3.953 -2.179 -3.233 -5.401 -6.312 -4.270 -3.095 -3.144 -2.903 -2.275
City 0.012 0.004 0.021 0.016 0.005 0.027 -0.033 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.028 0.021 -0.002 -0.011 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
0.636 0.197 1.010 0.746 0.219 1.250 -1.580 0.555 0.639 0.457 1.353 1.049 -0.111 -0.519 0.064 -0.091 -0.020 -0.035
N 5,000 5,099 4,809 4,841 4,845 4,986 5,020 4,821 4,941 5,031 5,063 5,021 4,993 4,721 4,874 4,965 5,046 4,931
RSQ 0.086 0.081 0.082 0.093 0.101 0.091 0.124 0.106 0.149 0.152 0.152 0.166 0.170 0.165 0.157 0.151 0.141 0.150
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present. Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or never married.
Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed. South: Region dummy = 1 if south.
Ccity: Central city metropolitan statistical area status dummy = 1 if central city.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12; IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16; C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
* t statistics.Table 3. Correlation matrices of sample (cross-) moments
m10 m01 m20 m11 m02 m30 m21 m12 m03
m10 -0.98 0.56 -0.82 0.91 -0.85 0.67 -0.55 0.51
m01 -0.98 -0.50 0.79 -0.91 0.80 -0.66 0.59 -0.54
m20 0.37 -0.40 -0.92 0.77 -0.25 -0.12 0.29 -0.31
m11 -0.79 0.82 -0.84 -0.96 0.50 -0.18 0.04 0.00
m02 0.81 -0.84 0.71 -0.93 -0.61 0.36 -0.26 0.20
m30 -0.93 0.87 -0.27 0.68 -0.68 -0.90 0.72 -0.66
m21 0.77 -0.70 -0.06 -0.38 0.41 -0.90 -0.93 0.86
m12 -0.76 0.71 0.10 0.36 -0.31 0.82 -0.91 -0.97
m03 0.75 -0.70 -0.01 -0.41 0.28 -0.76 0.74 -0.91
Above diagonal correlations for blacks and below for whites. Correlations of the sample moments used are in boxes.Table 4. Estimated coefficients of the augmented log wage regression.
Blacks Whites Blacks Whites
Constant 0.6 Constant 1.4 X/100 0.58 X/100 1.82
4.39 12.65 0.68 2.32
Constant1 22.37 Constant1 8.76 X/100_1 263.69 X/100_1 352.23
2.96 1.16 4.46 5.61
Constant2 408.73 Constant2 539.2 X/100_2 -3145.01 X/100_2 -5216.71
6.34 4.52 -7.88 -5.6
IHS -0.35 IHS -0.91 X2/10000 2.32 X2/10000 -0.04
-5.4 -14.02 1.46 -0.02
IHS1 11.71 IHS1 17.17 X2_1 -565.29 X2_1 -636.76
2.74 3.61 -5.31 -5.13
IHS2 -12.42 IHS2 402.5 X2_2 4323.32 X2_2 6595.91
-0.43 5.91 6.14 3.65
IC 0.47 IC 0.4 Trend 0.01 Trend -0.01
6.73 7.37 1.86 -18.59
IC1 -15.19 IC1 -18.08 Spouse 0.2 Spouse 0.22
-2.76 -3.72 32.3 38.97
IC2 -75.52 IC2 8.35 Nspouse 0.1 Nspouse 0.12
-1.85 0.11 12.29 15.05
C+ 0.65 C+ 1.17 North -0.07 North -0.03
8.01 21.49 -16.18 -8.44
C+1 -2.41 C+1 -26.58 South -0.22 South -0.1
-0.39 -5.57 -60.6 -33.07
C+2 -277.56 C+2 -425.76 City 0.07 City 0.03
-6.21 -5.7 18.19 7.59
n 104,648 n 167,190
r2 0.13 r2 0.1
t statistics calculated using White standard errors are presented.
IHS: Inc. High School, dummy = 1 if Educ<12.
IC: Inc. College, dummy = 1 if 12<Educ<16.
C+: College or more, dummy = 1 if Educ >=16.
X: Potential experience.
Spouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if married, spouse present.
Nspouse: Marital status dummy = 1 if neither married with spouse present or never married.
Private: Class of worker dummy = 1 if works for private firm or is self-employed.
South: Region dummy = 1 if south.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 1: Eﬀect of changes in σ2
e on equilibrium outcome. (This is equivalent
to changes in the signal to noise ratio in the labor market)
1Figure 2: Eﬀect of σ2
b on equilibrium outcome.
2Figure 3: Eﬀect of changes in degree of concavityof schooling tehnologyon
equilibrium outcome.
3Figure 4: Phase diagram in case of adaptive expectations
4Figure 5: Illustration of case (i), (ii)a n d( iii) in proposition 2.
5Figure 5.A













One Equilibrium Three Equilibria One Equilibrium BetaFigure 6







64 69 74 79 84 89 94
Log wage Difference Caused by Coefficients Estandard error of the coefficients componentFigure 7: Distribution of education levels for black males, 1964-19881.
1Years of education are gotten from substracting one year to the level shown in the
ﬁgure, i.e. to get the relative frequency of men with 12 years of education, read people
with 13 years of education in the ﬁgure.
8Figure 8: Distribution of education levels for white males, 1964-19882.
2Years of education are gotten from substracting one year to the level shown in the
ﬁgure, i.e. to get the relative frequency of men with 12 years of education, read people
with 13 years of education in the ﬁgure.
9Figure 9: Distribution of experience levels for black males, 1964-1988.
10Figure 10: Distribution of experience levels for white males, 1964-1988.
11Figure 11







64 69 74 79 84 89 94
Log wage Difference Caused by Coefficients Estandard error of the coefficients componentFigure 12







64 69 74 79 84 89 94
Log wage Difference Caused by Coefficients Estandard error of the coefficients componFigure 13







64 69 74 79 84 89 94
Log Wage difference: FIML Diff due to Coeff: FIML
Standard error: FIML Log wage difference: OLS
Diff due to Coeff: OLS Standard error: OLS